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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 There is a rule in my Parents’ house.  One that I would venture to say is probably 
a rule in most homes, albeit it a dwindling one:  “No cell phones at the dinner table”.  It is 
hard to believe that not so long ago, wireless mobile devices were used solely to make 
and receive phone calls, perhaps “text message” for the savvy cell phone user.  Those 
simple devices have turned into something entirely different with the advent of the 
modern Smart Phone, dubbed the “third screen” behind the television and the personal 
computer. 1   As a society we have come to rely on our Smart Phones for everything, from 
finding directions to communicating our whereabouts with friends.  These devices have 
become an essential body part – impossible and frightening to be without.  Yet, as a result 
of this modern, wireless world, we are constantly sharing personal information, 
particularly that of our geographic location. 
During the last decade, the exponential rise of social media and access to the 
Internet has caused users to reevaluate the importance of monitoring personal information 
disclosure.  Particularly, questions of privacy and control over personal information have 
gained momentum as data collection through geolocation technologies have become 
heightened legal and national importance.  However, while geolocation has become a bit 
of a buzz word, defining the technology and its potential legal ramifications has proven 
difficult.  Nearly everyone who uses the Internet is affected by geolocation in some 
capacity, whether they know it or not.  The technology is constantly working to allow 
Internet sites and mobile applications (Apps) to instantaneously identify a user’s 
geographic location, and in some instances, use that information to classify an individual 
                                                 
1 Dana B. Rosenfeld & Matthew P. Sullivan, “Legal Growing Pains in the Mobile App Market”, 
Metropolitan Corp. Couns., Sept. 1, 2011, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2011/September/13.pdf . 
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and target market accordingly. Specifically for Smart Phone users, if you have not “opted 
out” of being tracked by every application that uses the technology, and to a certain 
extent even if you have, your device is tracking you.   
  There is a common question voiced, particularly by younger consumers who 
frequently utilize technology in their purchasing behaviors:  Why does it matter that 
Companies collect geographic data, especially when the tools provide a benefit to the 
consumer?   After all, most will agree the growth of Smart Phone devices and mobile 
Apps have provided interesting, seamless ways to connect social media with purchasing 
behaviors and shared activities.  The answer: Money, power, and a serious invasion of 
personal privacy.  As previously stated, Geolocation technologies can aggregate a 
comprehensive profile of a person through tracking a user’s travel patterns, work habits, 
and precise location at any given moment.  With this information, market actors gain an 
advantage to use or misuse this data without much concern of breaking any Federal law.  
Indisputably, this technology and its potential have begun to revolutionize internet 
commerce and communication; however, the law has failed to keep up with the 
technology, leaving both Companies and consumers unaware of potential legal 
ramifications that may arise.     
This article seeks to address recent litigation regarding the use of client-side 
geolocation technologies, particularly in conjunction with the surge of Smart Phone 
devices available.  Furthermore, it aims to provide a recommendation to Companies on 
how to best utilize the technology in order to prevent the legal ramifications that may 
arise.  Part II will give a brief explanation of geolocation technology, address the rising 
presence of client-side geolocation tools through the use of Smart Phones, and speak to 
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the effect this has in target marketing campaigns.  Part III will examine current case law 
to underscore how Courts, who generally side with Defendant Corporations, have begun 
to grant Plaintiffs a pass at the pleading stage, particularly on claims asserting violations 
of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Unfair Competition Law, and User Agreements.  
Part IV will discuss the Wiretap Act, a significant claim asserted where Plaintiffs have 
generally failed.  It will also explore the ongoing California case Joffe v. Google and 
discuss how this could be a legal game changer for Plaintiffs asserting a Wiretap Act 
violation.  Finally, Part IV will examine how a lack of action by the Federal Government, 
has prompted the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and State legislatures to address 
privacy concerns and enforce safeguards against Companies utilizing the technology 
deceptively. Lastly, the article will provide three significant practices for Companies to 
consider before implementing geolocation technologies for target marketing purposes: 
Clear and concise User Agreements, opt-in functionality, and secure systems once 
personally identifiable information (PII) is collected.   
 
II. GEOLOCATION TECHNOLOGY – WHAT IS IT? 
 In order to fully appreciate the impact geolocation has on the law, one must first 
understand how the technology, scarce until a mere few years ago, functions.2  Generally 
speaking, geolocation is any means for detecting an Internet user’s geographic location.3  
While the technology can serve many purposes, its appeal to the advertising industry 
began when companies saw its potential for target marketing to users in real-time based 
                                                 
2 Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal 
Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 Alb. L.J.Sci. & Tech., 61, 63 (2011). 
3 Martketa  Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation, 22 
Fordham, Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J., 667, 592 (2012). 
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on their geographic location.4  Though the technologies vary, most fall into two 
categories: client-side and server-side.  Server-side geolocation technologies work 
remotely, acquiring information from a user that does not provide specific geographic 
location, but rather a user’s Internet Protocol (IP) address.5  The geolocation provider 
then evaluates the information against data contained in existing IP addresses and other 
geographic identifiers, matching an entry in the server’s database enabler.  When the 
geolocation provider makes a geographic match, it can often provide a website with a 
wealth of information about the user, such as the user’s location within a twenty-five to 
fifty mile radius and the device used to access the site.6 
Conversely, client-side geolocation tools operate on a user’s personal computer or 
wireless device to automatically identify a user’s location through a Global Positioning 
System (GPS) or nearby wireless tower.  Once the user’s location is tracked, the device 
will transmit that location when a website or content provider requests it.7  This user-
centric model enables client-side geolocation tools to more readily collect and 
disseminate personably identifiable information (PPI).  Further, client-side technologies 
establish a closer nexus with the user since Smart Phones and other GPS-equipped 
devices can be located within a radius of a few dozen feet as opposed to server-side 
technologies that collect data regionally.8  While client-side geolocation has been less 
                                                 
4 Id. at 587. 
5 Id. 
6 King at 68. 
7 Id. 
8Hiawatha Bray, “Software Puts Captions on the Real World”, Boston Globe, Sept. 24, 2009, 
http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2009/09/24/software_puts_captions_on_the_real_wol
d. 
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common in the past, the widespread increase of GPS-enabled Smart Phones has made this 
technology progressively more popular and controversial.9   
The most intuitive, and perhaps the greatest, use of geolocation technology is 
content localization through navigation Apps like Waze and mapping platforms such as 
Google Maps, Mapquest, and Bing Maps.10  However, in surveying the geolocation 
landscape, Companies are progressively using the geographic data for target marketing 
purposes, prompting the “World Wide Web” encounter to become less worldwide. 11  As 
the technology develops, websites are increasingly blocking certain groups of users – 
curbing the Web to target a specific region or user group.12  As an example, Digital 
Envoy, a leading geolocation provider, syndicates a user’s location with census data to 
target ads based on demographic profiling.  Data collection such as this allows companies 
to serve different ads to users of the same website.  For instance, the site could target 
market a high-end “Gold” American Express card to a user connecting from a wealthy 
suburb while simultaneously recommending the standard “Green” card to a user from a 
less affluent area.13   
Smart Phone Apps and other client-side tools are following suit as platforms like 
Google Now, Foursquare, and Yelp direct individuals with recommendations, reviews 
and deals based on the user’s specific location.14  The new features are designed to 
                                                 
9 See Ryan Kim, “Apple's Boosts Smart-Phone Market Share”, S.F. Chron., Feb. 24, 2010, at 
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Apple-s-boosts-smart-phone-market-share-3198940.php 
(recounting the increasing rate of Apple's iPhone sales).  
10 JD Lasica, “Beyond Foursquare: Geolocation Services Proliferate, Mature”, Feb. 28, 2013, at 
http://www.pbs.org/idealab/2013/02/beyond-foursquare-geolocation-services-proliferate-mature058/. 
11 Id. 
12 Anick Jesdanun, “Geolocation tech slices, dices World Wide Web”, USA Today, July 7, 2004, at 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-07-10-web-geolocation_x.htm#start  
13 Id. 
14 Lasica, supra note 10. 
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automatically present information to a user in real-time – even before you ask for it.15  
With an increase of these “targeted” applications, companies like Google and Apple have 
discovered more discreet methods of tracking users geographically and marketing 
accordingly.  The personal nexus of client-side tools coupled with the increase of Smart 
Phone applications pose incredible opportunities for future commerce as well as potential 
privacy risks.  Thus, this article will focus on client-side geolocation technology as 
privacy questions and issues appear to be outpacing the legal remedies available. 
 
III. BRIEF HISTORY OF CASE LAW AND SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS 
 
In lawsuits addressing geolocation issues, the Courts have struggled to uniformly 
apply the law16, often attempting to fit old laws into new technologies.  As with all novel 
claims, Plaintiffs tend to “throw in the kitchen sink” when filing complaints against 
Defendant Companies, hopeful their injury will fit into a state or federal statute.  Contrary 
to popular consumer belief,17 current federal law does not require Corporate giants like 
Google, Apple, and other App makers to obtain user consent, or even notify the user 
when collecting personal data through geolocation tools.18  However, while Defendant 
                                                 
15 See Mark Hackman, “Google Knows More About You Than Your Family Does – Are You Okay With 
That?” Jun. 29, 2012, at http://readwrite.com/2012/06/29/google-now-knows-more-about-you-than-your-
family-does-are-you-ok-with-that (recounting how Google Now automatically creates a series of “cards” 
that try to assist a user by presenting information Google thinks you’ll need  real-time based on the 
personal data it’s collected via how you use various Google services). 
16 See Somini Sengupta, “No U.S. Action, So States Move on Privacy Law, New York Times, (October 30, 
2013), at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/technology/no-us-action-so-states-move-on-privacy-
law.html?_r=0 (with no uniform Federal law in  place, over two dozen privacy laws have been passed in 
more than 10 states in the year 2013). 
17 Joseph Turow et al., “Contrary to What Marketers Say, Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and 
Three Activities that Enable It”, (2009), at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/20090929-
Tailored_ Advertising. 
18 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C §2702 (2006)   
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Companies have consistently been able to strike Plaintiff complaints with ease,19 there 
are a few areas of the law where Courts are beginning to grant Plaintiffs a pass, at least at 
the pleading stage.20  Part III will address the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Unfair 
Competition Law, and Privacy Agreements, three areas of law where Courts are 
beginning to allow Plaintiffs to prevail.   It’s important to note that the 9th Circuit has 
taken the lead in addressing internet privacy issues;21 and thus, CA State law and 
precedent cases will be the focus of this section.  Furthermore, as mentioned previously, 
the law in this area is generally unchartered as Courts and State legislatures are beginning 
to recognize the impending privacy issues at stake.  As a result, Part III will address 
recent litigation and analyze cases that are currently ongoing.  
A. Consumer Legal Remedies Act 
 
Due to the absence of federal precedent, plaintiffs will often invoke violations of 
State statutes or recently passed State privacy laws in lawsuits involving geolocation 
technologies.22  With the vast majority of these cases occurring in California,23 Plaintiffs 
have claimed a violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act under the California Civil 
Code.24  The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts 
                                                 
19 See Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 11-CV-3113-JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
26, 2013) (where Court  denied Plaintiff’s Wiretap Act,  Stored Communications Act, CFFAA, UCL, 
CLRA, Breach of Privacy, Breach of Contact, Private Disclosure of Private Facts and Intrusion, Trespass, 
and Conversion claims with leave to amend). 
20 In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d. 1040 (2012); See also In re Google Inc., No.13-MD-
02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918 at *24, (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013)(where Court denied Google’s motion to 
dismiss Plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claims because Plaintiffs’ sufficiently alleged Google exceeded scope of its 
own Privacy Policy and non-Gmail users did not consent to Google’s interception of emails; however, the 
Court held Plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that they had an objectively reasonable expectation that their 
email communications were ‘confidential’ per Cal. Penal Code§623 nor did they sufficiently allege a 
Pennsylvania law claim as it related to those who receieved emails from Gmail users.) 
21 See Somini, supra note 16, (recounting that California, the long pioneer on digital privacy laws, has 
passed three online privacy bills this year). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 iPhone II, 844 F. Supp. 2d. 1040, 1069-71. 
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or practices.”25  A claim may be brought under the CLRA pursuant §1780(a) which 
provides any “consumer who suffers damage as a result of the use or employment by any 
person of a method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful by §1770 may bring an action 
against such person”.26  The statute bans several types of conduct, such as representing 
that goods or services have characteristics or benefits which they do not have.27  Further, 
the statute forbids entities from falsely representing that goods or services are of a 
particular standard, quality, or that goods are of a particular style or model.28   
The CLRA is not a law of general application; rather, it applies to a narrow set of 
consumer transactions.29  For example, a CLRA claim may only be alleged by a 
consumer, whom the CLRA defines as “an individual who seeks or acquires by purchase 
or lease, any goods for personal, family, or household purchases.”30  Consequently, the 
CLRA does not apply to government or commercial contracts nor does it apply to 
contracts formed by non-profit groups and other non-commercial organizations.31 The 
CLRA is also inapplicable to customers entering into rental agreements.32  Finally, while 
there is a jurisdictional split as to whether software is a good under the UCC,33 the Ninth 
Circuit has previously determined the sale or licensing of software is not covered under 
the CLRA because software is neither a “good” nor “service”.34      
                                                 
25 Cal. Civ. Code §1770. 
26 Cal. Civ. Code §1780(a). 
27 Cal. Civ. Code, §1770(a)(5).   
28 Cal. Civ. Code §1770(a)(7). 
29 Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003). 
30 Cal. Civ. Code §1761(d). 
31 See Cal. Grocers Assn. Inc. v. Bank of America, 22 Cal. App. 4th 205, 217 (1994)(stating trade group, 
CGA, is not a consumer of services for family, household, or personal purposes as defined by the CLRA). 
32 Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 143 Cal. App. 3d., 133, 143 (1983)(holding that a costumer who rented a car does 
not fall within the definition of a “consumer” under the CLRA). 
33Dealer Management Systems Inc.  v. Design Automotive Group Inc., 355 App. 3d. 416, 422 (2005) 
34 See Ferrington v. McAfee, No. 10-CV-01455, 2010 WL 3910169 at *19 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010).  
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In the ongoing case iPhone II, Plaintiffs on behalf of both a Geolocation class and 
iDevice class allege that Defendant Apple violated the CLRA.  Plaintiffs representing the 
Geolocation class claim that at a cost to the consumer, Defendant Apple stored geo-
location information on user’s iDevices for Apple’s own benefit and Apple continued to 
collect geolocation data even when users switched the Location Services to “off”.35  They 
contend if Apple had disclosed the true cost of the geolocation technology, the value of 
the iPhone would have been materially less than what Plaintiffs paid.36  Similarly, 
Plaintiffs representing the iDevice class argue that a significant reason for the purchase of 
their iDevice was the appeal of the alleged “free” Apps; therefore, had Apple disclosed 
its intentions to track and collect personal information via its applications, the value of 
the iDevices would be materially less than what Plaintiffs paid.37  Furthermore, Plaintiffs 
hold that despite Apple’s statements regarding privacy protection, Plaintiffs did not 
consent to Apple’s tracking of their App use and personal information.38  In both cases, 
the Court substantiated the CLRA claim, not because the Apps downloaded were 
deficient, but because the iDevices (a “good” under the CLRA) did not perform as 
promised by Apple to consumers.39  Thus, Plaintiff’s claim properly arose out of the sale 
of a good, not the downloading of software.40 
 
 
  
                                                 
35 iPhone II, 844 F. Supp. 2d. 1040, 1070. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 1071 
39 Id. 
40 Id.; See also Yunker, 2013 WL 1282980 at *13 (where Court denied CLRA claim by Plaintiff who 
downloaded Pandora App, finding that a number of districts hold downloading a “software” does not fall 
within the statutory definition of a good). 
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B. Unfair Competition Law 
 
Plaintiffs litigating against Companies like Apple who utilize client-side geolocation 
tools may also succeed under their State’s Unfair Competition Law.41  The UCL creates a 
claim against business practices that are 1) unlawful, 2) unfair, or 3) fraudulent.42  The 
law’s coverage is sweeping and its standard for wrongful business is “intentionally 
broad” as to permit judicial tribunals to enjoin ongoing wrongful conduct as new business 
schemes, practices, and technologies continue to form and develop.43  To assert a UCL 
claim, a Plaintiff needs to have “suffered injury in fact and…lost money or property as a 
result of unfair competition.”44  In other words, to establish standing under the UCL, a 
Plaintiff must show she personally lost money or property because of her reasonable and 
actual reliance on the alleged wrongful business practice.45 Once injury is established, 
Plaintiff must show a statutory violation under one of the three prongs as each provides a 
distinct theory of liability.46  Interestingly, Plaintiffs in iPhone II were able to prevail 
under all three prongs of the UCL, begging the question of whether Courts are starting to 
take a closer look at business practices exploiting geolocation technologies.47   
Under the “unlawful” prong, the UCL prohibits any business practice that is also 
forbidden by law.  Essentially, the UCL permits injured consumers to “borrow’ violations 
of other laws and treat them as a separate, independently actionable claim of unfair 
                                                 
41 iPhone II, 844 Supp. 2d, 1040, 1074. 
42 Cal. Bus. & Profs. Cody §17200. 
43 In re First Alliance Mortg. Co., 471 F.3d 977, 995 (9th Cir. 2006); See also Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999)( “The Legislature ... intended by this sweeping language 
to permit tribunals to enjoin on-going wrongful business conduct in whatever context such activity might 
occur. Indeed, ... the section was intentionally framed in its broad, sweeping language, precisely to enable 
judicial tribunals to deal with the innumerable “ ‘new schemes which the fertility of man's invention would 
contrive”). 
44 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17204. 
45 Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 310, 330 (2011). 
46 Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc. 504 F.3d 718, 731 (9th Cir. 2007). 
47 iPhone II, 844 F. Supp. 2d. at 1072-74. 
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competition.48  Thus, in iPhone II, Plaintiffs were permitted to establish an independent 
action under the unlawful prong of the UCL through alleging Defendant’s violation of the 
CLRA.49   
Under the “unfair” prong, the UCL creates a cause of action for a business practice 
that is inherently “unfair”, even if it is not be forbidden by law.  For consumer cases 
specifically, the law under the unfair prong continues to be unsettled.50  Some Appellate 
State Courts define “unfair” as prohibiting conduct that is immoral, unethical, or injurious 
to consumers and have applied a balancing test, weighing the benefit of Defendant’s 
product or service against the gravity of harm to the alleged victims.51  Conversely, other 
Courts define “unfair” per the UCL as conduct that violates public policy pursuant a 
specific statutory, constitutional, or regulatory provision.52  In iPhone II, the Court did 
not apply one test over the other.  Rather, the Court conceded that while the societal 
benefits of Apple’s geolocation software may ultimately outweigh the harm to users, it 
was unwilling to make a factual determination at the pleading stage.53  Other Courts have 
found this reasoning persuasive and substantiated a Plaintiffs injury without applying 
either balancing test for the “unfairness” of the geolocation service.54 
Under the fraudulent prong, a Plaintiff must show that the public is likely to be 
deceived and allegations must be specific enough to give Defendants adequate notice of 
                                                 
48 CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. 479 F3d. 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007). 
49 844 F. Supp. 2d. at 1072 
50 Lozano, 504 F.3d at 735-36 (California's unfair competition law, as it applies to consumer suits, is 
currently in flux) 
51 S. Bay Chevorlet v. General Motors Acceptance, Corp., 136 Cal. App.4th 1255, 1260-61 (concluding the 
test of an unfair business practice “involves an examination of that practice's impact on its alleged victim, 
balanced against the reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer…the court must weigh 
the utility of the defendant's conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim”; See also People 
v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc. 159 Cal.App.3d. 509, 530. 
52 Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999). 
53 iPhone II, 844 Supp. 2d, 1040, 1073 
54 In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 11-md-02264 JSW, 2013 WL 1283236 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 26, 2013) 
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the alleged misconduct.55  Thus, claims of fraud must allege “an account of the time, 
place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the 
parties to the misrepresentations.”56  Again, despite the specificity requirement of the 
statute, the iPhone II Court felt it was justified to allow Plaintiffs’ claim to prevail. The 
Court found Plaintiffs on behalf of the geo-location class met the pleading burden 
through their allegations that in both Apple’s Terms and Conditions and its letter to 
Congress, Apple ensured an opt-out option for the geo-tracking feature.57  Plaintiffs 
showed they reasonably relied on Apple’s representations that an opt-out feature was 
available when making purchasing decisions.58 Similarly, Plaintiffs from the iDevice 
class successfully asserted that Apple’s failure to disclose its collection of personal 
information through geo-location technology materially affected the value of the Apple 
device purchased.59  
C. Violation of User Agreement 
 
When deciding to grant a motion to dismiss, Courts have been allowed to consider 
“User Agreements” between business entities and users under the incorporation by 
reference doctrine.60  Under California contract law, “if the language of the contract is 
clear and explicit, and does not involve any absurdity”, then that language will govern the 
interpretation of the contract.61  However, if the contract is capable of two different 
interpretations, the contract is ambiguous and the rules require the Court to interpret the 
                                                 
55  Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.1985). 
56 Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F. 3d. 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007). 
57 iPhone II, 844 F. Supp. 2d. 1040, 1074. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 In re Gilead Scic. Sec. Litig. 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (where Appellate Court reverses 
District Court’s decision holding motion to dismiss was inappropriate when material representations by 
Gilead created an unrealistic positive assessment.) 
61 Cal. Civ. Code § 1638 
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ambiguity against the drafter.62  While Plaintiffs have struggled to prove a violation of a 
User Agreement, particularly in the context of the internet, Courts are beginning to 
consider ambiguity in User and Privacy Agreements of tech giants like Google and 
Apple.63  In iPhone II, the Court found Plaintiffs had a colorable argument that Apple’s 
Privacy Agreement is ambiguous and found Plainiff’s claims may not necessarily be 
foreclosed against Apple.  The Court notes: 
“It does appear that there is some ambiguity as to whether the information collected by 
Apple, including the user's unique device identifier, is personal information under the 
terms of the Agreement, and thus whether Apple's collection and use of the information is 
consistent with the Agreement's terms”.64 
  
Yet again, the iPhone II Court found that at the motion to dismiss stage, it was unwilling 
to rule Apple’s agreement bars the company from liability.65 
A California Court conducted a similar analysis of Google’s Terms of Service and 
Privacy Agreements in In re Google Inc.  Plaintiffs here challenged Google’s operation 
of Gmail under the Wiretap Act alleging that Google intercepted, read, and acquired 
emails for the purpose of sending target advertisements relevant to the email sender, 
recipient, or both.66  Looking closely at Google’s policies, the Court found Google did 
not have implied or express consent to intercept emails to create user profiles and target market 
accordingly.67  Furthermore, the Court noted that consent within Privacy Agreements may 
be express or implied.  However, implied consent only applies to a narrow set of cases 
and the critical question is whether the parties whose communications were intercepted 
                                                 
62 Cal. Civ. Code § 1654 
63 See In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013WL 5423918, at *12-15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
26, 2013); iPhone II, 844 F. Supp. 2d. at 1076 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 In re Google Inc., 2013 WL 5423918 at *12-15. 
67 Id. 
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had adequate notice.68  Thus, the Court found it reasonable that Plaintiffs, upon reading 
Google’s Privacy Policies, would not have necessarily understood that their emails would 
be intercepted for target advertisement purposes.69 
 
IV. JOFEE V. GOOGLE – GAME CHANGER FOR THE WIRE TAP 
ACT? 
 
The majority of Plaintiffs affected by geolocation technologies will focus their 
cause of action around a violation of the Wiretap Act.  However, despite the frequency in 
which a violation of the Act is brought, Courts have consistently denied relief under the 
statute.70  The Wiretap Act generally prohibits the interception of “wire, oral, or 
electronic communications”.71  Specifically, the Act provides a private right of action 
against a person who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any 
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication.”72  While Plaintiffs have failed to substantiate a Wiretap Act claim 
against Companies misusing geolocation technologies, a recent CA case may change the 
tide.73   
In 2007, Google launched its “Street View” initiative, a panoramic viewing 
feature on its mapping services.  To capture street-level images, Google mounted cameras 
                                                 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1062 (where the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim partly because geo-location data 
collected by Apple was generated automatically rather than through the intent of the user.  Thus, the 
information did not constitute “content” prone to interception).; See also Google Gmail Privacy litigation, 
2013 WL 5423918 NDCA 13-MD-02430-LHK (Sept. 26, 2013). 
71 18 U.S.C. § 2520 
72 18. U.S.C. §2511(1)(a) 
73 Joffee v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d. 1262, 2013 WL 4793247 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2013). 
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on a fleet of cars.74  From 2007 to 2010 Google also furnished these cars with software 
and antennas capable of scanning wireless routers nearby to capture information like a 
network’s name and whether that Wi-Fi network was encrypted or not.75  This was done 
to enhance the accuracy of its location based services. However, the software also picked 
up actual data transmitted through the Wi-Fi networks.  This “playload data” included 
emails, usernames, passwords, and other personal data.76  In 2010, Google was highly 
criticized for the unwarranted data collection, publicly apologized, grounded the cars, and 
was ordered in some countries to delete the information entirely.77   
Numerous class action lawsuits against Google eventually consolidated into the 
ongoing case Joffe v. Google.  Plaintiffs ensued their cause of action claiming the 
Company’s data collection scheme violated State and Federal wiretap laws.78  In turn, 
Google moved to dismiss the case arguing the law was not violated because its data 
collection fell within an exception to the Wiretap Act per 18. U.S.C. §2511(2)(g)(i).79  
Under the exception, the interception of “electronic communication” that is “readily 
accessible to the general public” is permitted.80  Two legal arguments flowed from the 
statutory exception.  First, Google proposed the unencrypted Wi-Fi signal collected are a 
“radio communication” which by definition is “readily accessible to the general public”.  
Second, Google argued that even if it wasn’t a “radio communication” it was an 
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electronic communication that was “readily accessible to the general public” like a 
message posted to a public message board.81 
Because the Wiretap Act does not specifically define what a “radio 
communication” means, the Court had to first resolve whether Wi-Fi signals are in fact 
what Congress intended to include under the exception.82  Ultimately, the Court denied 
Google’s motion finding that unencrypted Wi-Fi signals were not "radio 
communications," but rather electronic communications.83  The Court concluded that 
Congress meant a "radio communication" to mean a "predominantly auditory broadcast" 
like an AM/FM radio broadcast.  Since the data sent over a Wi-Fi signal is not auditory, 
the Court held that it was not a "radio communication" under the Wiretap Act, regardless 
of whether a wireless access point used radio frequencies to communicate.84  In 
determining that the "radio communication" exception did not apply, the Court also 
rejected Google's second argument that unencrypted Wi-Fi signals are "readily accessible 
to the general public."85 The Court noted that unlike a radio station which could broadcast 
for miles, Wi-Fi signals are "geographically limited and fail to travel far beyond the walls 
of the home or office where the access point is located."86 In addition, the Court reasoned 
Wi-Fi signals aren't "accessible" because capturing them "requires sophisticated hardware 
and software" and "most of the general public lacks the expertise to intercept and decode 
payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network."87  With this decision, the lawsuit against 
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Google will continue, leaving the understanding and application of the Wiretap Act in a 
legal grey area.    
V. WHAT COMPANIES UTILIZING GEOLOCATION 
TECHNOLOGIES SHOULD IMPLEMENTS 
With the advent of geolocation technologies, the modern wired world has changed the 
way we interact considerably as the private sphere has become capable of new, seamless 
ways of tracking individuals.88  Private companies can now effortlessly obtain electronic 
personal information that was once only preview to the government through an 
investigation.89  As explained in Part II, geolocation technologies pose a considerable risk 
to individual privacy; and yet, Federal agencies have done little to address that risk.90  
With the absence of such laws, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has stepped in to 
address internet privacy issues, looking to Section 5 of the FTC Act and other rules 
governing online communities for guidance.91  Section 5 empowers the Commission to 
restrain “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce”.92  Within those principles, the FTC has 
stressed heightened protection for “Personally Identifiable Information” (PPI).93  In 
general, the Commission defines PPI as information that can be linked to a specific 
individual such as a name, postal address, email address, Social Security number, or 
driver license number.94   
                                                 
88 Fred H. Cate & Robert Litan, Constitutional Issues in Information Privacy, 9 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. 
L. Rev. 35, 61 (2002). 
89 Id. 
90 King at 115. 
91 Id. 
92 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1). 
93 King at 117. 
94 Id.  
20 
 
As noted previously, server-side geolocation technologies pose little risk to an 
invasion of PPI as they rely principally on IP-based and SSID-based identification 
techniques.95  Server-side tools are not meant to identify a particular user; rather, these 
tools seek users regionally within a twenty-five to fifty-mile radius.96  The same cannot 
be said for client-side geolocation tools.  Again, the user-centric model allows for client-
side technologies to more readily collect and disseminate PPI.97  In recent litigation, 
Plaintiffs have claimed that Defendant Companies diminished the value of their mobile 
devices when the geolocation features collected plaintiff’s PPI.98 While the Ninth Circuit 
has yet to address the issue, District Courts have been reluctant to grant plaintiffs a claim 
solely based on the theory that the value of their PPI has been diminished.99  However, 
when Plaintiffs bring forth other product harms, such as diminished battery capacity, 
overpayment theories, privacy issues and questionable user agreements, the Court has 
conducted a more thorough analysis of PPI collection.100  Part V will address where 
Corporations have both succeeded and failed with their target marketing platforms 
through client-side geolocation and how the FTC has addressed them.  Through this 
analysis, Part V will address the three critical practices Companies and web-site 
providers need to consider when utilizing geolocation platforms: 1) provide full discloser 
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in User Agreements, 2) obtain user consent with regard to such practices, and 3) provide 
security of consumer information once it’s collected.   
A. Notice - Clear and Concise Terms and Conditions 
 
Client-side geolocation technologies, which often pinpoint a person’s location 
through a user’s internet-connected device or Smart Phone, involve a thorough collection 
of PPI; thus, it is imperative that Companies provide significant notice with clear and 
concise terms before collecting such personal information.  In the past, Companies have 
made the mistake of providing notice of data collection that is unclear, ambiguous, or 
buried deeply in excruciatingly wordy Terms and Agreement.  The FTC has 
recommended that Congress enact legislation specifically to ensure a level of privacy 
protection by requiring websites and Internet companies to meet standards involving 
notice to consumers, consumer access to information, and security.101  While Congress 
has yet to establish clear standards per this recommendation, the FTC has interceded in 
many cases where internet providers and website operators failed to follow their own 
privacy policies.102  One noteworthy instance occurred when the FTC challenged Sear’s 
practice of paying customers ten dollars to download software onto costumers’ computers 
aimed to collect “research information” such as online purchases, bank statements, video 
rentals as well as the senders, recipients, and subjects of email messages.  The issue was 
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over Sears’ disclosure agreement, which buried the tracking software’s full capabilities in 
a lengthy and unclear document.  The outcome ended in a settlement agreement where 
Sears’ agreed to terminate collecting personal consumer information and destroy the data 
previously gathered.103 
Open, honest disclosure of information is a critical solution to geolocation privacy 
issues and exactly the resolution the FTC and privacy advocates promote.104  Clear notice 
will enable consumers to choose the appropriate level of privacy for them and whether 
the benefit of the product or service is worth foregoing their privacy.105  In order for 
consumers to make an informed decision, Companies must provide them with clear, 
comprehensible information.  Ironically, one of the biggest offenders, Google, has 
traditionally placed disclosure as a top priority.106  In fact, many in the industry would 
attribute Google’s success to two important corporate themes: “Be Honest” and “Be 
Open”.107  In fact, Google has often lead the way in undertaking measures and making 
concessions that other Companies have been unwilling to make.108  Google’s open model 
and willingness to admit to its mistakes has propelled the company to dominate 
practically every niche it has chosen to enter.  Yet, despite the success the search engine 
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King has reaped from its open approach, Google has made small steps toward 
implementing broad policies of disclosure in the realm of geolocation.  To be fair to 
Google’s efforts, it has created the program “Dashboard” which enables a user to manage 
the personal data associated with a user’s account.109  However, there is still much 
progress to be made by Companies like Google utilizing and it is highly recommended 
that these entities recognize that open disclosure is the key to consumer confidence. 
B. Opt – In Agreement  
 
Another way for Companies to protect themselves is to gain user consent by 
providing an “opt in” function to data collection rather than an “opt-out”.  If done 
properly, heightened consumer privacy would be ensured by holding Companies 
accountable for requesting user permission while ensuring that Companies request 
permission for geolocation data collection each time they desired it.  While FTC 
regulations require that sites obtain user’s consent before collecting personal data and 
geographic location110, Companies do not always follow suit.111  For instance, in fall 
2012, Nordstroms implemented in-store technology that followed Wi-Fi signals of 
customers’ Smart Phones to track the customer’s movements throughout the store.  The 
Wi-Fi tracking in conjunction with video surveillance enabled the clothing retailer to 
learn information about its shoppers such as age, sex, time spent in a particular aisle or 
department before purchasing merchandise, how frequently shoppers visited the store, 
and other demographic information. 112  Needless to say, once costumers caught wind of 
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Nordstroms’ experiment, they were outraged and felt the testing without consent was a 
serious invasion of privacy.  Subsequently, Nordstroms was forced to end its in-store 
research and destroyed the data previously collected.113  Understandably, this type of 
personal data enables Retailers to better merchandize product to give the consumer a 
more efficient trip; however, it is imperative to give the consumer the choice to opt-in 
rather than make the decision for her. 
Two recent examples show how the opt-in solution works in practice.  In 2009, 
Google launched its My Location feature for personal computers which used SSIS-based 
and client-side geolocation tools to provide “more accurate local search results on Google 
third party sites.114  During the product launch, Google sent an automatic prompt message 
explaining the My Location feature to all users equipped with Google’s in-browser tool 
bar.  The message also asked for the user’s consent to install the application, and only 
upon the user choosing to opt-in would the product begin to collect and report 
geolocation data through My Location.115  In August 2010, Facebook used a similar opt-
in strategy when launching “Facebook Places”, a feature that allowed users to share their 
whereabouts with friends through Facebook directly or through other third party 
platforms.116  The notice and consent based model was a result of the Social Media 
company’s development effort to put a stronger emphasis on user privacy than it had with 
previous Facebook features, which drew heavy criticism from the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and other privacy watchdogs.117 
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C. Adequate Security of Consumer information once collected 
 
The third concern of the geolocation technology is ensuring adequate safeguards to 
keep the personal data safe once collected.  Though corporate giants like Google and 
Apple claim they take the greatest precautions in securing data, two recent breaches of 
the Sony PlayStation 3 system have unmasked some scary realities.118  In April and 
October of 2011, criminal hackers successfully accessed online subscriber information 
including the credit card numbers of seventy-seven million costumers.119  The events 
proved that despite heightened security measures, even megacorporations like Sony may 
be unable to keep personal information secure.  Thus, it is imperative that entities housing 
this personal data are certain the more secure safeguards are in place.  
Foursquare, a location-based social networking App, is another company that has 
been under fire for faulty security of consumer information.  Foursquare is an application 
that allows users to “check in” to venues such as restaurants, shops, and perhaps most 
frightening, an individual’s home.120  In February 2010, the site ‘Please Rob Me’ was 
launched to raise awareness regarding the thoughtlessness of location sharing.  The site 
automatically scans data from public Twitter feeds that had been pushed from Foursquare 
to compile a list of people who are not home. The premise, while putting a humorous spin 
on it, is that since the user is not home, you can go rob them.  According to the site’s 
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founder, “On one end we're leaving lights on when we're going on a holiday, and on the 
other we're telling everybody on the internet we're not home." 121   
Later in 2010, white hat hacker Jesper Anderson exposed vulnerabilities on 
Foursquare that raised significant privacy concerns.122  Foursquare’s location page 
displays a grid of fifty randomly chosen pictures of users who “checked in” to a location, 
regardless of the users’ privacy settings.  So, whenever users “checks in” to a venue, their 
picture is generated on that location’s page, even if they only want their friends to know 
the location.  Anderson was able to fashion a script that collected check-in information 
and successfully collected 875,000 check-ins.123  Anderson then contacted Foursquare 
regarding the vulnerability and the social networking site changed its’ privacy settings to 
allow users to opt-out of being listed on the location page.124  In 2012, Foursquare 
announced a change in its Application Programming Interface (API) for increase privacy.  
The modification was in response to a number of so-called “stalker” applications, like 
“Girls Around Me” and “Nock Nock” that rely on the user geographic data Foursquare 
provides to display a list of people filtered by gender who checked in nearby.125   Again, 
as we become more connected, Companies cannot be ignorant to the security risks that 
come with the geolocation territory.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Though geolocation capabilities were unheard of less than a decade ago, the 
developing technology offers accurate real-time means for identifying a user’s 
geographic location.  Companies and consumers are increasingly latching on to these 
tools – recognizing the wide range of benefits and efficiencies they can offer through 
target marketing and social media platforms.  However, while the market has reacted 
quickly to the developing technology, the law has failed to keep up, leaving both buyer 
and seller in the dark.  The ongoing march of technological advances is not only a good 
thing, it’s essential to the economic and social revolutions of our time.  However, as 
companies begin to utilize the technology in new and interesting ways, safeguards must 
be in place.  The infringement of personal privacy by geolocation technologies is a 
serious problem that beckons a solution.  More and more companies are utilizing the 
technology to target market their services or selling that data to third parties unbeknownst 
to the user.  With a lack of uniform laws to protect personal information, the consumer is 
largely unaware of the transaction occurring, to whom that data may be benefitting, and 
who may be able to purchase the information.   
At the end of the day, consumer privacy is critical to maintain and the Federal 
Government must take action to protect it.  However, until that day comes, it will be up 
the FTC and States to implement privacy policies and hold Companies accountable for 
deceptively tracking personal information.  Likewise, for the sake of good social policy, 
Companies utilizing geolocation should look to provide users with notice in clear User 
and Privacy Agreements, allow for a user to opt-in to the technology, and ensure the most 
secure practices to keep personal information safe.  Disclosure is key and Companies 
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must be honest and open to instill consumer confidence.  Geolocation tools will continue 
to develop and the “Googles” of the world will always be on the cutting edge of it as they 
should.  Still, it’s imperative that Corporations act responsibly; consumers continue to ask 
the important privacy questions; and for the Court system to keep up with the rapidly 
changing technology and establish new precedent to guide our modern world.  
 
 
